Alfonso Rodriguez v. Secretary of Department of Env by unknown
2015 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-16-2015 
Alfonso Rodriguez v. Secretary of Department of Env 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015 
Recommended Citation 
"Alfonso Rodriguez v. Secretary of Department of Env" (2015). 2015 Decisions. 257. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015/257 
This March is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2015 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
                                                                                                  NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
_____________ 
 
No. 14-3467 
_____________ 
 
DR. ALFONSO RODRIGUEZ, M.D., 
 
         Appellant 
 
v. 
 
SECRETARY OF PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION OF PENNSYLVANIA;  
CHAIRMAN OF THE PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION;  
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 
       
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(District Court No.:  3-12-cv-01458) 
District Judge:  Honorable A. Richard Caputo 
       
 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
On March 16, 2015 
 
 
Before:  RENDELL, FUENTES, and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
 
 
(Opinion filed: March 16, 2015) 
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O P I N I O N* 
   
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
 Appellant Dr. Alfonso Rodriguez sued the Pennsylvania Attorney General and the 
Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection challenging the 
constitutionality of Pennsylvania Act 13 of 2012.  The District Court dismissed his case 
for lack of standing, and we will affirm.   
 Rodriguez challenges § 3222.1 of Act 13, which provides two mechanisms for 
health professionals to learn proprietary information about the chemicals used in 
fracking.  In medical emergencies, a health professional can obtain this information if he 
verbally agrees that he will keep the information confidential and only use the 
information for the specific medical emergency.1  In addition to the medical emergency 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
1 This medical-emergency provision states: 
If a health professional determines that a medical emergency exists 
and the specific identity and amount of any chemicals claimed to be 
a trade secret or confidential proprietary information are necessary 
for emergency treatment, the vendor, service provider or operator 
shall immediately disclose the information to the health professional 
upon a verbal acknowledgment by the health professional that the 
information may not be used for purposes other than the health needs 
asserted and that the health professional shall maintain the 
information as confidential. The vendor, service provider or operator 
may request, and the health professional shall provide upon request, 
a written statement of need and a confidentiality agreement from the 
health professional as soon as circumstances permit . . . . 
58 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3222.1(b)(11).   
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provision, there is a non-emergency provision that requires fracking companies to 
provide proprietary information to any health official who executes a confidentiality 
agreement and provides a written statement of need showing that he needs the 
information for diagnostic or treatment purposes.2   
 Rodriguez is a nephrologist in Dallas, Pennsylvania, in which hydraulic fracturing 
occurs and wastewater ponds of fracking fluids are located.  He asserts that direct or 
indirect contact with fracking fluid can cause negative medical conditions and that proper 
treatment requires knowing the environmental toxins to which his patients may have been 
exposed.  He describes himself as “a willing speaker to alert the public, in the broadest 
possible manner, of known dangers posed by high-volume hydraulic fracturing” and he 
“intends to publicize any threat to public health and safety derived from any information 
obtained from the gas drilling industry under Act 13.”  (App. 54.)  He claims that 
“[e]xpert testimony at trial will also establish that the Medical Gag Rules interfere, on a 
daily and ongoing basis, with plaintiff’s ability to properly diagnose and treat his 
                                              
2 The non-emergency provision states: 
A vendor, service company or operator shall identify the specific 
identity and amount of any chemicals claimed to be a trade secret or 
confidential proprietary information to any health professional who 
requests the information in writing if the health professional 
executes a confidentiality agreement and provides a written 
statement of need for the information indicating all of the following: 
(i) The information is needed for the purpose of diagnosis or 
treatment of an individual. (ii) The individual being diagnosed or 
treated may have been exposed to a hazardous chemical. (iii) 
Knowledge of information will assist in the diagnosis or treatment of 
an individual. 
58 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3222.1(b)(10).   
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patients.”  (App. 51.)3  He asserts that he “will testify that the Medical Gag Rules 
interfere with the free and open exchange of information expressly required of plaintiff 
by the ethical obligations imposed by the medical profession” and that “[e]xpert 
testimony at trial will establish that in both emergency and non-emergency situations 
plaintiff is ethically prohibited from signing any confidentiality agreements imposed by 
the Medical Gag Rules.”  (App. 51.)  He asserts that “[e]xpert testimony at trial will also 
establish that the inability of plaintiff to secure information as to the purity of local water 
supplies threatens plaintiff’s ability to properly diagnose and treat his patients and 
imposes upon plaintiff a present and ongoing threat of civil liability for any improper 
diagnosis and treatment as a direct and proximate result of the Medical Gag Rules.”  
(App. 51-52.)   
 The District Court issued two opinions, first dismissing Rodriguez’s complaint 
and then dismissing his amended complaint.  The District Court held that Rodriguez’s 
alleged injury was too conjectural to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III 
standing.  It noted that, although Rodriguez alleged that he required the information 
described in Act 13 to treat his patients, he did not allege that he had been in any 
situations where he needed or attempted to obtain such information.  He also did not 
claim that his communications had been constrained due to Act 13 or that he had been 
forced to sign a confidentiality agreement under Act 13.   
                                              
3 He refers to Act 13 as the “Medical Gag Rules.” 
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 On appeal, Rodriguez argues that the District Court erred because he does have 
standing.   
 We agree with the District Court that Rodriguez has failed to allege an injury-in-
fact.  “[T]he irreducible constitutional minimum of standing” requires that the plaintiff 
must have suffered an “injury in fact”—an invasion of a legally protected interest which 
is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or 
hypothetical.  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).  It is insufficient 
to allege, as Rodriguez has done, that expert testimony will substantiate his claims at 
trial.  See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“A pleading that offers ‘labels and 
conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’ 
Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual 
enhancement.’”) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007)).   
 Rodriguez relies on Robinson Twp., Washington Cnty. v. Com., 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 
2013), to argue that doctors have standing to challenge Act 13.  While the Robinson court 
did hold that a doctor had standing to challenge Act 13, it is distinguishable because it 
applied state law standing principles.  In fact, the Robinson court noted that “[i]n contrast 
to the federal approach, notions of case or controversy and justiciability in Pennsylvania 
have no constitutional predicate, do not involve a court’s jurisdiction, and are regarded 
instead as prudential concerns implicating courts’ self-imposed limitations.”  Id. at 917.  
Rodriguez’s reliance on Pennsylvania law as authority regarding federal standing 
requirements is misplaced.   
 Accordingly, we will affirm.   
